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Why are some societies relatively rich and others
relatively poor? This is perhaps the most funda-
mental question in all of economics. Although
aspects of the issue remain unresolved, there is a
consensus among economists that well-defined
property rights, low and stable inflation, and 
reasonable regulatory and taxation regimes are
conducive to growth. In short, markets do produce
the goods. 
But what produces the institutions that are 
necessary for the development of a well-function-
ing market system? That is the question that
economist Timur Kuran of Duke University has
been asking recently. In particular, his work has led
him to wonder why the Middle East, probably the
most prosperous region of the world in the Middle
Ages, failed to grow in the way that Western
Europe has during the last several centuries. The
product of that research will appear in 2010 with
the publication of his book Islam and Economic
Underdevelopment: Legal Roots of Organizational Stagnation
in the Middle East.
Kuran has been interested in the economics of religion
for many years, but much of his early work was on a very
different topic: What are the incentives that lead people
often to express a certain preference privately but
another publicly — and what are the public policy impli-
cations of such “preference falsification”?
Before coming to Duke in 2007, Kuran taught at the
University of Southern California for 25 years. He also
has held visiting positions at the University of Chicago
and Stanford University. 
Aaron Steelman interviewed Kuran in his office at Duke
on Sept. 16, 2009.           
RF: Could you briefly discuss what you mean by the
phrase “preference falsification”?
Kuran: Preference falsification is the act of wanting one
thing and saying that you want another, or having one rank-
ing among options but conveying another publicly. It
happens frequently in every society. Just to be polite, for
instance, we may express admiration for something we don’t
really admire. Preference falsification also occurs in
response to perceived social pressures. We perceive that if
we don’t express admiration for something or, alternatively,
we don’t condemn something, we ourselves will be con-
demned or else miss out on a particular reward. The
motivating perception need not correspond to reality.
Finding ourselves in a group of people looking at a painting,
we may sense that the group considers it beautiful, perhaps
because the painting is famous, when actually everyone
thinks it is pretty mediocre. So we wind up praising the
painting because this appears to be a safe course of action. In
such contexts preference falsification does not do much
harm. If we always said what popped into our minds, there
would be more frictions, and more hurt. White lies serve a
useful purpose.
However, preference falsification is common also in situ-
ations where it does measurable harm. When a community
is trying to decide how to govern itself or which economic
policies to pursue, untruthfulness distorts the political 






















































 RF: Do you believe that preference falsification is, on
net, harmful?
Kuran: As I said, I think that the impact is negative when it
comes to politics. On personal matters, the effects are rela-
tively benign. Still, I can think of examples where it is
harmful in social life. As individuals, sometimes we need to
hear the truth. Aperson can benefit from being urged to get
his life in order. By expressing ourselves candidly, we might
avoid big problems down the road.
RF: Perhaps there are instances, though, where prefer-
ence falsification is beneficial for public policy. For
example, if you live in a relatively market-oriented sys-
tem that is improving people’s standards of living, you
might be better off having people who harbor highly
interventionist sympathies falsify their preferences.
Kuran: Preference falsification on the part of mad and crazy
people is a good thing, of course. Your example does not go
to an extreme; it involves ambiguity. But, yes, having a 
system that induces people with bad ideas to refrain from
expressing them is probably beneficial on the whole. There
are also drawbacks, though. 
Most people living in a liberal, market-oriented regime,
such as the one you describe, are going to be content. The
regime will have few opponents. It would be better to allow
the few crackpots to express themselves than to make life so
miserable for them that they are driven underground, and
into militant movements. On balance, liberal regimes do not
have to worry about crazy ideas, from the left or the right.
Today, at New York’s Grand Central Station there are people
who sell Trotskyite newspapers, as they have for 50 years. I
have always wondered how these newspaper sellers make a
living. Who buys their newspapers? Yet, I am glad that they
sell the papers in public, and that they are not being forced
underground.  
RF: Can preference falsification be modeled?
Kuran: Yes, it can be modeled because the individual decid-
ing whether to falsify his preferences or express them
truthfully faces trade-offs. He will earn benefits or incur
punishments depending on the choice he makes. In falsify-
ing their preferences, individuals do what is in their own
best interest, given the social pressures that they perceive.
So they are maximizing something, which is the essence of
economic modeling. Whether the social consequences are
optimal is something else; often they are not. This is not 
the only context where individually optimal choices harm 
society. A wide range of individually rational choices 
generate negative externalities. The point is that preference
falsification does lend itself to modeling.
If the phenomenon poses any analytic challenge, it con-
cerns not formalization but predictability. Most economists
build models to predict the future. But in models involving
preference falsification, information under the surface, 
in other words private information, makes it difficult 
to predict. 
Consider a society that is on the verge of exploding, on
the verge of a huge shift in public opinion amounting to a
revolution, such as the East European Revolution of the late
1980s or the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79. We can model
this society without having an inkling of what is about to
unfold. After the revolution has taken place, the same model
will make it seem too obvious to miss. Preference falsifica-
tion was present prior to the revolution (there was often a
large penalty associated with being seen as a dissident) and,
in the opposite form, after the revolution (no one wanted to
admit that they liked, or benefited from, the previous
regime). The former manifestation of preference falsifica-
tion limited predictability. The latter manifestation makes it
hard, after the fact, to understand why prediction is subject
to error. 
RF: Still, it seems perplexing that most social scientists
had very little idea what was going on in the Soviet Bloc
in, say, 1988.
Kuran: I agree. In retrospect it does indeed seem odd that
most analysts of the Soviet Bloc totally missed what was
going on. At the time the Soviet Bloc seemed essentially
static in a political sense. Now we can identify what hap-
pened. Here is the apparent sequence of events. In 1985
Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Bloc, acknowledged
publicly that the regime was facing serious problems and
that the Soviet system needed rethinking. The ensuing
reforms, known as perestroika, legitimized the expression of
new ideas, including ideas that had been bubbling under the
surface but expressed only in clandestine publications. The
second major initiative, glasnost or openness, formally
opened up the system to public criticism.
In the 1985-89 period the secret police organizations of
the Soviet Bloc kept a pretty close eye on public opinion.
The records show that confidence in the system had fallen
sharply. Gorbachev and the other Soviet leaders thought
they could control the apparent decline in confidence, but
events overtook them. The general lesson, I think, is that in
an inefficient, authoritarian regime legitimizing dissent may
lead to its demise. There are obvious implications for the
future of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other oppressive regimes
that generate considerable discontent. 
RF: Some economists have argued that in, say, the case
of China, economic liberalization will ultimately lead to
political liberalization. What are your thoughts?
Kuran: I certainly agree. Chinese economic liberalization is
producing a prosperous middle class. At present this middle
class is putting up with social controls because it is getting
richer at a very rapid pace. Sooner or later it will want to
share political power.  
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it relatively easy for people to vote
their private preferences. If that is
the case, do the politicians we elect
(and the policies they enact) accu-
rately reflect what we want as a
polity? Or does the fact that we
sometimes censor our private
beliefs lead to a more constrained
debate, where views outside the
perceived mainstream are not
widely voiced and, hence, candi-
dates who represent those views
are not afforded a place alongside
more conventional candidates?
Kuran: In a modern democracy, we
elect candidates by a secret ballot.
This is partly because we recognize
that preference falsification distorts
the choices we make collectively. The
secret ballot allows voters to express
choices without risking retaliation.
Yet, the voters who go to the polls do
not face a full menu of options.
Typically, their options have been truncated by a political
struggle that ran its course well before the polls opened.
Candidates have been selected in an environment in which
money matters enormously, and those able to raise sufficient
money are the candidates who have said nothing offensive to
key constituencies. The upshot is that on most issues candi-
dates take positions fairly close to the middle of the
ideological spectrum. This is not to deny that political par-
ties can differ on particular issues. However, the process that
I have described does weed out individuals with ideas that
are perhaps premature or perceived as risky. Such individuals
never come before us as serious candidates. Consequently,
on almost any issue one can identify positions that ought to
receive political consideration but do not.
Let me illustrate this claim through an example. As every-
one knows, a large share of our health care resources goes to
terminally ill people. Meanwhile, millions of young and 
middle-aged people lack health insurance. Obviously, many
of the people in the latter group would benefit from insur-
ance. Hence, society should be discussing the merits of
rationing health care subsidies to the very old in the interest
of providing better health care to the young and middle-
aged. Yet, few individual leaders are willing to do so openly
and honestly. It is extremely risky even to mention the exis-
tence of a trade-off. 
Judge Richard Posner might be mentioned as an excep-
tion. I do not know whether he has written specifically
about the trade-off in question. However, on a number of
other issues he has taken quite radical positions that other
circuit court judges are not willing to take. Perhaps the 
reason is that he is unlikely to be nominated to the Supreme
Court. If so, he has little to lose by
stating his preferences truthfully
and much to gain from solidifying
his reputation within the legal pro-
fession as someone prepared to
voice his opinions fervently. A
younger circuit court judge, or a law
professor eyeing a Supreme Court
nomination, has everything to lose
from taking positions perceived as
radical.
RF: How did you become inter-
ested in the economics of religion? 
Kuran: I grew up in Turkey, which
is a predominantly Muslim country
with a secular constitution. At 
the time, educated Turks were 
overwhelmingly supportive of 
secularism. They agreed that the
abrogation of Islamic law was justi-
fied and approved of making
westernization an official policy.
Yet no one talked about the disad-
vantages of the discarded Islamic institutions. Implicit in all
discussions was the idea that these institutions were harm-
ful; they resulted in backwardness, they delayed Turkey’s
industrialization, they kept the literacy rate low, and so on. I
never understood the mechanisms involved because the
claims were not publicly debated. 
I came to the United States for college and got interested
in economics. At the time, economists showed no interest in
religion. Religion was one thing and economics another; nei-
ther had anything to contribute to the other. As a Ph.D.
student in economics, I did not do any work that touched on
religion. However, I thought that one day I would explore
this topic. 
When I completed my dissertation in March 1982, I
already had a job lined up for September. I decided to give
myself one month to read works I would probably not read
as an assistant professor trying to publish in conventional
subfields of the discipline. This was my reward for graduat-
ing early. Wandering through Stanford’s Green Library in
search of interesting books, I came across such titles as 
Islam and Economics and Islam and Development. These were
books written by “Islamic economists.” They claimed 
that the world’s economic problems could be solved by
returning to Islam. The arguments appeared interesting yet
superficial. I shared my criticisms with some friends, who
encouraged me to turn them into an article. 
Before my move to the University of Southern California
that fall, I had drafted a critique of this literature. The
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization published the
piece in 1983, following two rounds of revisions. Soon after
publication I started getting calls. Islamist movements were
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for economics. On account of one journal article, I wound
up being invited to conferences and seminars as an expert. I
denied being an expert; all I had done was to read some
books and write a critique. But apparently I belonged to a
tiny group of formally trained economists who had studied
Islamic economics with an open mind and objectively.
Before I knew it, I was writing other articles on the subject.
My research began to encompass Islamic economic reforms
that were taking place in countries like Pakistan and
Malaysia. The book Islam and Mammon collects some of my
major findings and arguments. 
RF: Is there such a thing as “Islamic economics,” or is it,
as some have claimed, an invented tradition? 
Kuran: Although the concept of “Islamic economics” dates
from the 1940s, it is promoted as a very old doctrine that
gave rise to many practical successes. In that sense it is
indeed an invented tradition. Today, Islamic economics con-
stitutes a vibrant school of thought. It is the subject of
international conferences at which various issues are debat-
ed. In terms of analytic sophistication it does not rise to the
level of neoclassical economics or even Marxist economics.
The rather repetitive literature that falls under the rubric of
Islamic economics promotes certain principles, and it
revolves around certain pet issues. Over the years, I should
add, its sophistication has grown. There now exist quarterly
journals of Islamic economics that have the feel of the
American Economic Review, at least in the sense that they are
filled with models and statistical tests.
If you are asking whether Islam offers a distinct form of
economics, my answer is no. The economic principles
spelled out in the Koran closely resemble ones found in the
Bible. The Koran encourages transparency in economic rela-
tions. It promotes honesty. It requires people to be
charitable toward others. Such prescriptions are not unique
to Islam, or, for that matter, to religion. 
RF: What, then, are the principles of “Islamic economics,”
according to its proponents? 
Kuran: The Islamists have latched onto three specific 
principles to distinguish their version of economics from
neoclassical economics, Keynesian economics, and Marxist 
economics. The first is the ban on interest. If implemented,
such a ban would have huge consequences. The second 
principle involves redistribution from rich to poor, accord-
ing to an Islamic template. The Koran prescribes a form 
of redistribution called zakat. Islamic economists want 
zakat to be the foundation of redistribution. The third 
principle is that economic relations should be built on the
norms I mentioned before: honesty, transparency, and 
justice. As I have already said, these can be extracted from
the Bible as easily as from the Koran.
These three principles are compatible with a wide 
array of economic systems. This is evident from the 
diversity of the economic agendas characterized as Islamic. 
Some Islamic economists have inferred that they lead 
to Islamic socialism. Others have used the same principles 
to rationalize free markets. 
RF: How commonly do we observe those three princi-
ples actually being practiced in Islamic countries?
Kuran: Certain societies have made interest illegal. But
there is no example of either a Muslim or non-Muslim 
society, past or present, that has done away with interest in
practice. There is always a demand to borrow money at
interest. That demand induces people to find ways to cir-
cumvent the ban.
As a redistribution system that emerged in seventh-
century Arabia, zakat reflects seventh-century Arabian 
conditions. It requires wealth holders to transfer shares of
their precious metals, camels, and crops to the poor. The
requirements are highly specific; for that reason they lost
relevance as the early Arab empires conquered Syria, Iraq,
and Egypt, all relatively urbanized societies with a different
resource base than largely nomadic Arabia. Islamic econo-
mists have tried to restore the significance of zakat. Some
have argued that rates set centuries ago should be imple-
mented today, and that the taxable commodities should
remain the same. 
Where these traditionalists have had their way, there
have been perverse consequences. In Malaysia, for instance,
zakat has been collected from peasants but not from urban
workers or civil servants. As a result, inequality has actually
increased. The majority of Islamic economists are now 
trying to reinterpret zakat to suit modern conditions. Some
have called for a radical reinterpretation: Wealth should be
shared not only within Muslim countries but also among
them. If the radicals get their way — unlikely anytime soon
— the richer Muslim countries would redistribute wealth to
the poorer ones.
RF: The Islamic world was relatively prosperous during
the Middle Ages but then suffered through a long 
period of near stagnation. What accounts for that?
Kuran:  The Middle East and Europe started out with 
similar commercial institutions around the year 1000. 
The institutions used to pool labor and capital were not 
different in any essential respect. But the European variants
adapted much more quickly to changing circumstances than
those of the Middle East. Evidently there were greater
incentives to innovate in Europe than in the Middle East.
Why? One important difference involved inheritance 
practices. The Koran prescribes a highly egalitarian inheri-
tance system. All children, including daughters, get a share
of the estate. There was a downside to this egalitarianism.
The estates of successful businessmen tended to get 
fragmented, making it difficult for successful businesses to
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The problem was exacerbated by another Islamic institu-
tion: polygamy. The wealthiest members of a Muslim
community tended to have multiple wives and, hence, many
more children than the norm. Precisely because they were
wealthy, their children tended to survive in greater numbers.
So when a wealthy businessman died, there tended to be
many inheritors. In principle, the inheritors could have
banded together to keep the family business going. In prac-
tice, such cooperation was uncommon. We know of great
entrepreneurs in premodern Egypt and Turkey who built a
massive business network, amassed a great deal of capital,
and developed a stellar reputation. Their business empires
did not survive them. 
In Europe, there existed a wide variety of inheritance sys-
tems. The one that contributed most to economic growth
and modernization, especially in Great Britain, Holland,
Belgium, Switzerland, and parts of France, was primogeni-
ture. Under primogeniture the entire estate goes to the
eldest son. It is not by chance that these countries developed
more rapidly than other parts of the world. In contrast to
the Islamic inheritance system this form of inheritance
enables business continuity across generations. Ironically,
the Islamic system is relatively more egalitarian, and it con-
forms more closely to modern sensibilities. Nevertheless, it
had the effect of retarding economic modernization and,
ultimately, industrialization.
Because of the prevailing inheritance system in the
Middle East, people tended to keep their partnerships small
and ephemeral. In Western Europe, where the fragmenta-
tion of estates could be prevented, people were willing to
form large and durable partnerships. Larger and longer-last-
ing partnerships created problems of coordination,
communication, and risk-sharing. Efforts to alleviate these
problems led to organizational advances. By the 16th and
17th centuries, business corporations were being formed 
in Western Europe. Nothing resembling this dynamic
unfolded in the Middle East.
As these corporations became larger, their shareholders
started looking for a way to withdraw capital without endan-
gering the entire enterprise. The emergence of the early
stock markets in Amsterdam and London provided this 
convenience. Large publicly traded companies stood to 
benefit from standardized accounting; it would facilitate the
valuation of their shares. In the Middle East, these develop-
ments were absent because they were not needed. 
What made Great Britain an industrial power was not
only the invention of technologies such as the steam engine.
In the 19th century one could easily ship a steam engine 
to Cairo. However, Cairo lacked the institutions of modern
capitalism, so it could not have used a steam engine effi-
ciently. Institutions are critical to economic performance,
and in the course of the second millennium they became
increasingly sophisticated in Western Europe but essentially
stagnated in the Middle East. This is the basic argument of
my book to be published in 2010 by Princeton University
Press, tentatively titled Islam and Economic Underdevelopment:
Legal Roots of Organizational Stagnation in the Middle East. 
In researching this book, I looked at about 10,000 
commercial cases from the 17th century, all recorded in the
court archives of Istanbul. Why Istanbul and why the 17th
century? Until modern times Istanbul was the most
advanced commercial center of the Eastern Mediterranean,
and it was during the 17th century that organizational forms
in Western Europe registered the advances essential to 
modern economic life. My goal was to see whether parallels
existed in Istanbul. 
I plan to continue mining the resulting data set in forth-
coming papers. Because the original documents may prove
useful to other researchers working on related questions, I
will also be publishing the data set itself. A 10-volume col-
lection of 17th-century court cases will appear in 2010. It will
contain summaries in English and modern Turkish, along
with transliterations of the Ottoman-Turkish transcripts. 
RF: I have noticed that you typically use the word
“underdeveloped” rather than “developing,” which
seems to be the preferred term among economists in
this field. Is your choice of words meant to represent an
important distinction?
Kuran: “Developing” is a euphemism that emerged in the
1970s to describe what used to be called “backwardness” or
“underdevelopment.” It was considered a more gentle, and
thus more acceptable, alternative to the term I prefer to use,
“underdeveloped.” Yet some of the countries lumped
together under the rubric “developing” have not been devel-
oping in any meaningful sense; they have become poorer, not
richer. To call them “developing” does not do their people
any good; on the contrary, it does harm by obscuring the
need for fundamental reforms. Terms ought to illuminate
phenomena, not obfuscate them.
“Underdeveloped” is a more satisfactory term for my 
purposes because it signals my concern with relative
economic performance. During the second millennium, the
Middle East continued to grow, though more slowly than
Western Europe. My central question is whether Islam 
contributed to turning the Middle East into a region that is
poorer than Europe. 
RF: What is your next project?
Kuran: I have now turned my attention to political under-
development in the Middle East. Where the book about to
be published focuses on commerce and finance, the next one
will focus on democratization, political liberties, and the
evolution of governance patterns. The Islamic world’s polit-
ical underdevelopment has to do with failures to develop
political checks and balances; and those failures are related
to the very institutions that led to economic underdevelop-
ment. Economic and political liberalization are mutually
supportive processes. RF
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